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In a world marked by wicked social problems, The Minefield helps you negotiate the ethical dilemmas, contradictory claims and unacknowledged complicities of modern life.

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What Winnie-the-Pooh teaches us about friendship, care and the desire to be useful

54 min

The decade straddling the First World War was a period of unusual brilliance and fecundity in British culture. There were the great formal innovators of literary modernism: Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, D H Lawrence and E M Forster. But then there were those more closely associated with mass culture, who enjoyed a degree of commercial success as well as cultural influence: Rudyard Kipling, Bernard Shaw, H G Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, J M Barrie, Agatha Christie, P G Wodehouse, G K Chesterton, Jerome K Jerome, even Charlie Chaplin. Many of these authors moved in the same circles, crossed paths with one another and promoted each other’s work. Indeed, most of the male writers, at one point or another, belonged to an amateur cricket team founded by Barrie — best known as the author of Peter Pan — named “the Allahakbarries” (evidently on the basis of the misapprehension that the Arabic phrase Allahu Akbar denotes something like a general petition for divine help, the equivalent of “Heaven help us”). Perhaps the unlikeliest member of this generation of famed writers was a self-deprecating, somewhat reclusive detective story writer and occasional columnist for the satirical weekly magazine Punch, named Alan Alexander Milne. Having enjoyed some modest success as a playwright after the war, on 21 August 1921 Milne purchased a nondescript brown teddy bear from Harrods at Knightsbridge as a birthday present for his infant son, Christopher Robin. Gradually, the nursery would be populated with a small society of stuffed animals: a drooping donkey for Christmas that same year; a tiny piglet the following year from a next-door neighbour in London; later on, a green-eyed tiger, a kangaroo and her joey. It was Milne’s wife, Daphne, who brought the menagerie to life for her son, supplying the voices, the dispositions, the relationships. Observing their play, a couple years later A A Milne penned poem called “Teddy Bear” in which the first glimpses of his most famous creation ca...

Did the US midterm elections mark the end of Trumpism?

54 min

There is something reassuring about the predictability of midterm elections in the United States. In the twenty midterms that have taken place since the end of the Second World War, the party of the sitting president has seen a swing against it in all but two instances. It’s not unusual for the governing party to lose control of one or both Houses of Congress, even when the president is relatively popular. This reflects something of the reactive nature of modern democratic politics. Voters overwhelmingly tend to rebuke rather than reward — and midterm elections are an effective way of communicating their grievances or their sense of the unresponsiveness of the sitting government. But the 2026 midterm elections did not just “send a message” to the Trump administration. The size and extent of the swing against the Republican Party represents as thoroughgoing a repudiation of the first two years of a presidency as we’re likely to see. The Democratic Party, which was decimated and demoralised after the 2024 election, saw a swing in the popular vote of 13 points, delivering a huge majority in the House of Representatives. More importantly, this voter surge flipped seven states that were overwhelmingly Republican — five of which (North Carolina, Ohio, Iowa, Texas and Kansas) were carried by Trump in 2024 by more than 10 points — delivering them a larger than expected majority in the Senate. In the aftermath, Trump has claimed, defiantly: “I wasn’t on the Ballot and if I was, we would have won IN A LANDSLIDE!” But it’s hard to interpret these midterms as anything other than a referendum on Trump himself. After all, 47 times over the course of the campaign, he told rallies to “pretend I’m on the ballot”. Voters were clearly fed up with high fuel prices due to the ongoing war in Iran, the heavy-handed and sometimes lethal conduct of ICE agents, the economic effects of tariffs and the reports of indecent profiteering and outright corruption on the part of Trump, his family an...

Political charisma — why is it both powerful and perilous?

54 min

Over the last decade, large majorities of voters in advanced democracies like the United States, the UK, France, Germany and Australia have come to feel that their elected representatives are not responsive to their needs, do not put the interests of people over politics, are not capable of delivering on their promises, are not truthful, and are, generally speaking, “corrupt”, or at least “in it for themselves”. (Compare, for instance, the remarkably similar findings in the OECD’s 2026 “Trust in Government” survey, the recent “Australian attitudes towards government and democracy” report commissioned by the Centre for Policy Development, and ANU’s “Political and policy attitudes in an age of pessimism” report from March this year.) This trend has led even some democratic theorists to conclude that the problem with modern politics is, well, politicians. It’s an easy sentiment to sell, and its appeal has been a boon for those “political entrepreneurs” who are particularly adept at harnessing underlying popular resentment and disrupting the status quo, only to find themselves subject to the same laws of electoral gravity when in government. Before taking the leap and advocating for citizen rule by means of “lottocracy” or some other form of sortition, it is worth asking ourselves what we actually want from politicians. Is competence and effectiveness in the delivery of vital public services enough? Or do we both expect and need more? For there seems to be a troubling paradox lying beneath the popular discontent: either politicians function as idées fixes, as mere things upon whom the people can obsessively heap blame for all that has gone wrong, who are exempt from ordinary human consideration and thus “fair game” for harassment, abuse, even violence; or politicians bear a weight popular expectation that verges on the messianic. In other words, there is a tendency to view politicians as either sub-human or super-human. This is where the fraught question of the nature o...

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The newest 50 of 387 episodes

What Winnie-the-Pooh teaches us about friendship, care and the desire to be useful

54 min

The decade straddling the First World War was a period of unusual brilliance and fecundity in British culture. There were the great formal innovators of literary modernism: Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, D H Lawrence and E M Forster. But then there were those more closely associated with mass culture, who enjoyed a degree of commercial success as well as cultural influence: Rudyard Kipling, Bernard Shaw, H G Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, J M Barrie, Agatha Christie, P G Wodehouse, G K Chesterton, Jerome K Jerome, even Charlie Chaplin. Many of these authors moved in the same circles, crossed paths with one another and promoted each other’s work. Indeed, most of the male writers, at one point or another, belonged to an amateur cricket team founded by Barrie — best known as the author of Peter Pan — named “the Allahakbarries” (evidently on the basis of the misapprehension that the Arabic phrase Allahu Akbar denotes something like a general petition for divine help, the equivalent of “Heaven help us”). Perhaps the unlikeliest member of this generation of famed writers was a self-deprecating, somewhat reclusive detective story writer and occasional columnist for the satirical weekly magazine Punch, named Alan Alexander Milne. Having enjoyed some modest success as a playwright after the war, on 21 August 1921 Milne purchased a nondescript brown teddy bear from Harrods at Knightsbridge as a birthday present for his infant son, Christopher Robin. Gradually, the nursery would be populated with a small society of stuffed animals: a drooping donkey for Christmas that same year; a tiny piglet the following year from a next-door neighbour in London; later on, a green-eyed tiger, a kangaroo and her joey. It was Milne’s wife, Daphne, who brought the menagerie to life for her son, supplying the voices, the dispositions, the relationships. Observing their play, a couple years later A A Milne penned poem called “Teddy Bear” in which the first glimpses of his most famous creation ca...

Did the US midterm elections mark the end of Trumpism?

54 min

There is something reassuring about the predictability of midterm elections in the United States. In the twenty midterms that have taken place since the end of the Second World War, the party of the sitting president has seen a swing against it in all but two instances. It’s not unusual for the governing party to lose control of one or both Houses of Congress, even when the president is relatively popular. This reflects something of the reactive nature of modern democratic politics. Voters overwhelmingly tend to rebuke rather than reward — and midterm elections are an effective way of communicating their grievances or their sense of the unresponsiveness of the sitting government. But the 2026 midterm elections did not just “send a message” to the Trump administration. The size and extent of the swing against the Republican Party represents as thoroughgoing a repudiation of the first two years of a presidency as we’re likely to see. The Democratic Party, which was decimated and demoralised after the 2024 election, saw a swing in the popular vote of 13 points, delivering a huge majority in the House of Representatives. More importantly, this voter surge flipped seven states that were overwhelmingly Republican — five of which (North Carolina, Ohio, Iowa, Texas and Kansas) were carried by Trump in 2024 by more than 10 points — delivering them a larger than expected majority in the Senate. In the aftermath, Trump has claimed, defiantly: “I wasn’t on the Ballot and if I was, we would have won IN A LANDSLIDE!” But it’s hard to interpret these midterms as anything other than a referendum on Trump himself. After all, 47 times over the course of the campaign, he told rallies to “pretend I’m on the ballot”. Voters were clearly fed up with high fuel prices due to the ongoing war in Iran, the heavy-handed and sometimes lethal conduct of ICE agents, the economic effects of tariffs and the reports of indecent profiteering and outright corruption on the part of Trump, his family an...

Political charisma — why is it both powerful and perilous?

54 min

Over the last decade, large majorities of voters in advanced democracies like the United States, the UK, France, Germany and Australia have come to feel that their elected representatives are not responsive to their needs, do not put the interests of people over politics, are not capable of delivering on their promises, are not truthful, and are, generally speaking, “corrupt”, or at least “in it for themselves”. (Compare, for instance, the remarkably similar findings in the OECD’s 2026 “Trust in Government” survey, the recent “Australian attitudes towards government and democracy” report commissioned by the Centre for Policy Development, and ANU’s “Political and policy attitudes in an age of pessimism” report from March this year.) This trend has led even some democratic theorists to conclude that the problem with modern politics is, well, politicians. It’s an easy sentiment to sell, and its appeal has been a boon for those “political entrepreneurs” who are particularly adept at harnessing underlying popular resentment and disrupting the status quo, only to find themselves subject to the same laws of electoral gravity when in government. Before taking the leap and advocating for citizen rule by means of “lottocracy” or some other form of sortition, it is worth asking ourselves what we actually want from politicians. Is competence and effectiveness in the delivery of vital public services enough? Or do we both expect and need more? For there seems to be a troubling paradox lying beneath the popular discontent: either politicians function as idées fixes, as mere things upon whom the people can obsessively heap blame for all that has gone wrong, who are exempt from ordinary human consideration and thus “fair game” for harassment, abuse, even violence; or politicians bear a weight popular expectation that verges on the messianic. In other words, there is a tendency to view politicians as either sub-human or super-human. This is where the fraught question of the nature o...

Will the alleged attack on Helen Haines change Australia and its politics?

54 min

The alleged attack on independent MP Helen Haines outside her electorate office in regional Victoria came as a shock to a nation with so little history of violence directed at elected representatives. The driver of the Toyota LandCruiser that pinned Haines against her car, causing her to lose both legs, has been charged with several offences, and appeared on Wednesday before the Wangaratta Magistrates’ Court. He remains in custody. The police are continuing their investigations into the driver’s mental health and motivations. But regardless of whether his actions were politically motivated, the alleged attack has had an immediate effect on Australian politics. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reiterated his plea to “lower the temperature” of political debate. Opposition leader Angus Taylor insisted “that political violence must never be accepted as part of public life”. One by one, politicians came forward with their own accounts of the abuse, harassment and violent threats that are part of the “new reality” of Australian politics. Only last week, Labor front-bencher Anne Aly reported receiving 19 death threats on social media following comments by Liberal MP Angie Bell that she and the prime minister be “shamed and stoned in the square” over an Australian Tax Office decision (comments that Bell has since described as “regrettable”).  ASIO chief Mike Burgess gave a sober warning about the “permissive environment of violence” in this country. Meanwhile, Governor-General Sam Mostyn appealed to the way that Helen Haines herself modelled civility and dedication to her community, urging Australians to: “ensure that we are in fact disagreeing well, not fighting with one another, not descending into violence and chaos and division. Most importantly, that we learn or relearn to exercise our muscle of decency.” While the alleged attack may be unprecedented in Australia’s history, and its life-altering consequences for a figure as respected and admired as Haines is appropriate...

Why do we keep remaking films and TV shows?

54 min

Over the last decade, the proliferation of streaming services made more movies and television series available to more people than ever before. It revolutionised what we watch (including the importance of recommendation algorithms to help us sort our preferences) and how we watch it (hence the rise of binge watching). And while prestige back catalogues and perennially rewatchable sitcoms — from ‘Seinfeld’ and ‘Friends’ to ‘The Office’ and ‘The Big Bang Theory’ — were initially valuable commodities for attracting new subscribers, keeping them meant “original” content and “exclusive” series. Suddenly, a phenomenon characterised by unprecedented abundance ran up against the problem of scarcity. ‘Stranger Things’ and ‘Squid Game’, ‘Severance’ and ‘Widow’s Bay’ became outliers in a digital landscape largely bereft of new ideas — which would see the companies follow Disney’s lead and race to secure the kind of intellectual property that can be serialised and spun out in new iterations for years (like Netflix’s purchase of the Roald Dahl Story Company for almost US$700 million in 2021). The problem of scarcity has also served to accelerate a trend that is as old as Hollywood itself: the tendency to adapt, recycle or remake already existing material. Some of the greatest cinematic achievements after the advent of sound were themselves either adaptations of stage plays or remakes of silent-era films, to say nothing of the steady stream of literary fiction and bestsellers that were turned into cinematic masterpieces (two of the prime examples from the early 1970s being ‘The Godfather’ and ‘Jaws’). And then there are those successful films and television series whose first (and often best) instantiations were outside of the United States — we could think here of Kurosawa’s ‘Seven Samurai’ (1954) and ‘High and Low’ (1963), ‘The Office’ (2001-2003), ‘Broadchurch’ (2013) and ‘House of Cards’ (1990-1995) in the UK, or the Danish version of ‘The Killing’ (2007) — which would go on...

These days everything is political — is that bad for politics?

54 min

Writing in the 1850s, at the advent of what we would come to understand as the popular press — which is to say, periodicals for mass distribution, rather than aimed at paid-up members of unions and parties, or mercantilists with particular interests in, say, the price of cotton — Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard diagnosed that the invention of “opinion” solved a problem created by the newspapers themselves. For while the papers brought distant events “near” to readers, it did not expand their agency or capacity to act “morally” upon those events. The news informed them, but also made them feel more powerless. But then “opinion” came along and added an emotional dimension to news consumption: not just what happened, but what to make of it — how to feel about it. Before long, Kierkegaard noted, having a strong opinion became, in itself, a moral act. The opinion could be attained cheaply (for the price of the newspaper), it could be wholly derivative (and so lack the element of authenticity, of inner struggle and therefore responsibility), it could be displayed strongly (to the extent that it could be “worn”, like fashion, as an expression of oneself) and have no bearing whatsoever on events. But the opinion holders themselves felt like they’d done something meaningful. In this way, said Kierkegaard, intensity of feeling with an absence of “interiority”, a sense of moral agency with impotence. Though the differences between the media in Kierkegaard’s time and our own social-media saturated age are vast, his diagnosis is nonetheless a salutary one. Emotion is, after all, the currency of contemporary politics. Indeed, it is the form our politics takes. It can coalesce digitally around a cause célèbre and spill out onto the streets in mass demonstrations. It can sweep incumbents from power and elevate firebrands promising to dismantle the status quo. Intensity of feeling is often the strongest indicator of voter turnout in places like the United States. At a time when...

If AI can’t be brought under human control, why are we still pressing ahead?

54 min

When the history of artificial intelligence is written, the middle months of 2026 may well emerge as a kind of turning point. For this was the period when hundreds of programs or “AI agents” developed by the frontier lab OpenAI went “rogue” and executed a series of sophisticated, self-directed hacks on the websites of dozens of private companies and sovereign nations. The tech start-up Hugging Face became the unwitting “face” of these cyberattacks when the company first disclosed it had been hacked by OpenAI agents in July. The release of a report by AI safety nonprofits METR and Redwood Research at the end of August revealed both the sheer extent of the Hugging Face incident and the existence of troubling behaviours on the part of a swarm some 700 AI agents, which was at various points cooperative, coercive, paranoid, petty and straightforwardly deceptive. It became what some would describe as the first “warning shot” of what might happen when the increasing proficiency of these AI agents intersects with the problem of misalignment — which is to say, their pursuit of goals that are detrimental to human safety, security and wellbeing. As one of the lead investigators of the METR/Redwood report, Ajeya Cotra, would subsequently reflect: “This [Hugging Face] incident was far more severe than I expected, and far more severe than previous publicly documented misalignment incidents, both in terms of how concerning the agents’ motives were and the feats they achieved in pursuit of those motives … Compared to these reward hacks from six months ago, this incident feels like it’s more than 50% of the way to full-blown AI takeover, routing through first taking over the AI company itself. Another jump like this along these propensity dimensions — scale, cooperation between agents, ambition and horizon length of misaligned goals, deceptiveness — seems like it could motivate agents to try very hard to maintain a covert, persistent rogue deployment within the AI company … Once the...

Last Words: Is ‘Abbey Road’ a fitting end to the Beatles?

54 min

In our previous explorations of famous “last words” — performances or compositions delivered with a certain end in view, with a sense of either culmination or parting, or with an eye to the future and hence to what one leaves behind — we limited ourselves to the words of individuals spoken to their followers or fellow-travellers. The words of the Prophet Muhammad and of Martin Luther King, Jr, were replete with exhortation; they functioned both as expressions of fidelity to a task, and as examples to be followed by others. Which is to say, the messages were oriented beyond their speakers, toward some greater goal their audience must take up and pursue — hence the Prophet Muhammad’s stress on fidelity and continuity (“All those who listen to me shall pass on my words to others and those to others again …”) and King’s on fearlessness and a “dangerous unselfishness” (“I’m not fearing any man …”). This next instalment is different in almost every way. The words are not of one individual but a group — perhaps the most famous group of the twentieth century. There is no “message” per se, and not really anything being communicated to others. Their words are largely self-referential, intensely personal, quasi-autobiographical or else plain nonsense. The goal of the composition, the “end” (telos) it has in view, is evidently nothing more than its own aesthetic perfection. It is not a performance as much as it is a production: bits and pieces of earlier ideas gathered together, elaborated, reworked, enhanced, added to and repeatedly overdubbed between 22 February and 19 August 1969. This is a reference, of course, to the last album recorded by The Beatles, Abbey Road. The album began amid the fragments, financial chaos and interpersonal strife of the infamous “Get Back” sessions of January 1969. And while Let It Be, which represents the uneven results of those recordings, appeared later in May 1970, Abbey Road is the album that has all the hallmarks of an “end”. But even this...

Does a ‘digital duty of care’ put free speech at risk?

54 min

Evidence has been mounting for more than a decade that social media tears away at the fabric of democratic life by eroding the conditions of deliberation, shared understanding and mutual trust; that it is the conduit of widespread misinformation, disinformation and malicious conspiracy theories; that it is a driver of hate, sexism and prejudice and has been used to incite violence; that its addictive design and prolonged exposure to harmful content has had egregious damage to the mental health and emotional wellbeing of adolescents. Until recently, the size of tech companies responsible for the social media platforms, the speed with which new technologies are being deployed and the scale at which they are being adopted has meant the companies have managed to stay several steps ahead of attempts to impose effective regulation and demand accountability. But a combination of the law catching up and a sharp turn in public sentiment against the companies themselves has led to a series of legislative responses around the world intended to mitigate the harms social media platforms cause. Last week, the federal government released the exposure draft of its Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026. First floated in 2024, this is the third such measure the Albanese government has introduced — the others being its abandoned Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 and its world-leading Online Safety (Age-Restricted Social Media Platforms) Rules 2025. Alongside specific provisions to remove harmful content (such as AI generated “fake nude material”), the proposed legislation is notable in its adoption of more preventative measures, including requiring companies to conduct regular risk assessments in order to “proactively identify harmful content”. While this is a measure already in effect in the UK and parts of the EU, perhaps the more notable provision in the proposed legislation is giving social media users...

Is loyalty a virtue?

54 min

It is surely one of the more perverse achievements of modern marketing to have taken words that have a certain moral valence — which is to say, words that connote intimacy or an interpersonal bond — and use them to describe purely commercial or easily exploitable forms of behaviour, thereby stripping those words of what made them valuable in the first place. Consider what the word “share” meant before the advent of social media platforms: it encompassed such activities as partaking in a common meal, defusing interpersonal conflict by making a small sacrifice, and having a confiding, perhaps even intimate, conversation with another person. After the introduction of the “Share” button and its use as a way of measuring user “engagement”, the personal aspect that made the word appealing is lost within the sterility of forwarding a bit of content to somebody else. The same goes for the word “friend”. In the modern era, the template for the misuse of morally laden words for commercial purposes was established by the decision of marketing agencies in the 1940s to adopt the term “loyalty” as a way of describing the kind of customer behaviour they wanted to cultivate — namely, an “attitudinal and affective attachment that keeps the customer coming back regardless of convenience or changes in features or price relative to the competition”. But, of course, it could be argued that there is something about “loyalty” that lends itself to such use (in which case, can it really be called a perversion of the term?). Loyalty tends to be associated with two attributes: stickiness and solidarity. The former signals a determination to stand by a family member or acquaintance or organisation facing difficulties (this would represent the opposite of being a “fair weather friend”); the later suggests a desire to protect one’s “own” from either external attack or reputational damage. It is for this reason that hierarchical organisations and nations tend to prize loyalty above all else, and...

Live from the Festival of Dangerous Ideas: Does longevity threaten the future?

54 min

It is suitably ironic that one of the most poignant, and pertinent, moments in Homer’s The Odyssey was airbrushed out of Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster adaptation. The first time we meet Odysseus, the endlessly resourceful architect of the fall of Troy, he is indeed weeping on the shores of the nymph Kalypso’s island. But it is not due to the unrelieved guilt he feels from his war crimes; rather, we are told, “his tears never did dry, since the sweetness of life was trickling away / As he grieved for his return home” (Book V.153). For the immortal goddess had kept the mortal Odysseus for seven years, not in a prison, but in a paradise, an Eden-like cave warmed by fire, lined with fragrant trees, filled with carnal delights. Each night, Kalypso — unageing and beautiful, whose figure is described as “being in full bloom” — would sleep with Odysseus (“he unwilling, she all too willing”) and promise him at once agelessness and unending pleasure if he would but remain with her in her cave. Depart for Ithaca, “the land of your fathers”, she warns, and not only will he have an inferior wife awaiting him, but he will endure unimaginable hardship on his journey home. Since we are given a god’s-eye tour of Kalypso’s cave before we learn of the choice being put to Odysseus, surely the unequivocal nature of his response is meant to surprise — even though without it, there would be no story! Given the choice between immortality and solidarity with the hardships and daily joys of the world, Odysseus chooses the world, and death with it. “Such simple greatness is foreign to our minds today”, writes Albert Camus; “we simply lack the pride of the man who is faithful to his limitations — that is, the clairvoyant love of the human condition.” Increasing numbers of us seem prepared to turn our backs on the world in order to remain in Kalypso’s cave. Sometimes, this takes the form of attempts to so optimise the body that it defies, or indefinitely postpones, ageing and death (Bryan Joh...

What response does Jason Arday’s life, and death, morally demand?

53 min

It is hard to imagine a series of events more tragic, more unseemly, more emblematic of the performativity and polarisation that dominate our time, than the premature rise, sudden fall and untimely death of Jason Arday. In 2023, the University of Cambridge announced that it had appointed Arday — a 37-year-old son of Ghanaian immigrants, who grew up in public housing in south London and only “began to read and write in his late teens” due to his autism diagnosis — to the position of Professor of Sociology of Education. Not only was he the youngest black professor in the university’s history, but he was promoted by Cambridge as an individual whose life story epitomises “the significant barriers that neurodivergent individuals, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people face when trying to build careers” in the academy. Arday was thus held up as a living proof that Cambridge was taking seriously the criticism, frequently voiced during the #BlackLivesMatter ferment, that there was a conspicuous lack of “black professors, and lecturers and senior lecturers and academics and researchers” at the university. He also represented a kind of downpayment on a larger promise to promote “greater inclusivity” among Cambridge’s otherwise exclusive academic community. Paradoxically, Cambridge even mentioned Arday’s struggle as a young academic to get published as uniquely qualifying him for the role of “helping as many ethnic minority and under-represented people as possible gain access to opportunities within the sector”: “When I started writing academic papers, I had no idea what I was doing … I did not have a mentor and no-one ever showed me how to write. Everything I submitted got violently rejected. The peer review process was so cruel, it was almost funny, but I treated it as a learning experience and, perversely, began to enjoy it.” It would become part of the Arday-mystique that he published his first peer-reviewed paper in 2018,...

Is opposition to data centres good news for democracy?

54 min

At a time of profound polarisation, when the fracturing of media ecosystems has been so complete that any agreement on threats to our common life seems impossible, an issue has emerged capable of bringing voters of every political persuasion together. Over the last year, popular opposition to the construction of the data centres in the United States has risen dramatically. According to a Gallup poll from May 2026, more than seventy per cent of Americans are opposed to the construction of a data centre in their area. In June, a Heatmap poll got the same result, and found that over fifty per cent of respondents said they favoured a ban on new data centres altogether. Meanwhile, fifteen states are considering, have introduced or already passed legislation temporarily banning data centre development. Something similar is happening in the UK and Australia, where government eagerness to attract vast investment from AI companies has encountered strident opposition from local communities and electorates. The Australian Greens have called for a moratorium on data centres, while Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party is urging stronger government regulation on AI. The South Australian state government has tried to get out ahead of electoral anxieties by announcing a royal commission into AI. The proximate reasons for this opposition are straightforward enough. They primarily have to do with the effect of data centres on the environment, water and energy usage, utility costs, the amenity of adjacent communities and noise pollution. Lurking behind these concrete concerns is the more visceral alarm over the sheer speed of advances in AI over the last three years, along with the gargantuan sums of money frontier labs have spent in their pursuit of ever more “compute” and sources of data for training their models, as well as the out-sized influence that this new generation of tech oligarchs have had on government decision making. Behind it all, there are the deep-seated worries about w...

Should fat from cadavers be used for cosmetic procedures?

54 min

The widespread availability of GLP-1 based drugs has been lauded as a “revolution in weight loss” and as inaugurating the “end of obesity”. As we’ve discussed previously, health benefits aside, there are concerns that such weight-loss drugs don’t just leave certain cultural assumptions about beauty and body size unchallenged, but in fact reinforce a kind of cultural aesthetic hierarchy — elevating slimness to the level of a kind of moral demand (with the opprobrium that accompanies failure to live by it). Those concerns remain. But the uptake of use of GLP-1 drugs in places like the United States — where 11 per cent use drugs like Ozempic and Wegovy, according to Gallup — has intersected with a parallel cultural phenomenon in interesting and rather morbid ways. What happens when the demand to be slim encounters the idealisation of body shapes: fuller curves, more defined muscles, plumper lips, tighter skin, sharper cheeks? Not long after GLP-1 based drugs were made more widely available to the public for the purposes of weight loss, a series of fat-based fillers were made available to certain plastic surgeons who were experienced in working with fat. But unlike the more common procedure of autologous fat grafting — the process whereby the person’s own fat is removed by means of liposuction and injected into another part of the person’s body — these fat-based fillers are harvested from cadavers. The fat is then treated, bottled and injected into target areas in order to achieve the desired look. Though the treatment is expensive, it is becoming increasingly popular due to the “chunkier” and more “natural” look of the filler, and because the procedure doesn’t require either general anaesthesia or an extended recovery time. Most people will instinctively recoil from the prospect of injecting cadaver fat — parts of human bodies that have been reduced to “biological material” — into one’s own body for the purposes of cosmetic improvement. There is a certain moral intuiti...

How to protect democratic politics from the malign influence of money?

54 min

Ever since Aristotle, it has been recognised that money poses a particular threat to the integrity of political office. Ever the realist, Aristotle knew that those who seek political office are invariably motivated by a certain ambition (philótimo). Though not problematic in itself, but when combined with avarice (philochrematía) it can give rise to a form of corruption as corrosive as the unconstrained exercise of political power. For as Aristotle would put it, one who accepts gifts (katadōrodokoúmenos) will also be one who shows favouritism (katacharizómenos). He holds up as an example the council of “elders” (gérontas) in Sparta, who were “well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs” (Politics II.1271). The fault of the Spartan system, he concluded, the source of its underlying political rot, was a kind of pervasive unaccountability (aneuthúnos), such that citizens no longer had a reasonable expectation of impartial treatment from lawmakers — which is to say, they could no longer expect justice. The suspicion of hidden influence and the fear of special consideration undermine the faith of citizens in our shared institutions to behave justly. Even when these institutions are conducting themselves equitably and representatives are making decisions on principled grounds, the ubiquity of money in politics breeds mistrust and ensures that suspicion lingers just below the surface of democratic life. This is why any healthy political order depends on trust and is sustained through rigorous forms of public accountability. For once democratic faith is lost or significantly damaged, it lends credence to the claims of populist entrepreneurs and charlatans that politics per se is corrupt and that anti-democratic means are the only way to fix an untenable status quo. Concerns around overt political corruption and undue influence being exerted by oligarchs and billionaires over government policy have reached endemic levels in places...

What happens to our moral lives when we stop reading books?

54 min

According to every available metric, the number of people who read books across almost every demographic in countries like Australia and the United States has fallen precipitously over the last fifteen years. Whether it be for enjoyment or edification, reading books is no longer something many of us choose to do. As Rose Horowitch writes in her recent cover story for The Atlantic, “The decline in reading cuts across age groups, gender, and education levels. Even the demographics that traditionally read the most — retirees, women, and college graduates — have seen a collapse.” This isn’t to say we don’t read. Indeed, the paradox is that this crisis of literacy comes at a time when we are inundated with words. The incessant production and circulation of texts constitute our cultural milieu, to the point that we could say these messages are our medium. But isn’t there is a vast difference between merely looking at or reacting to or skimming words on a screen, and the kind of sustained attentiveness or self-forgetting patience that is demanded by the commitment to immerse oneself in a book? Just as there is a vast difference between expressing oneself in writing and supplying prompts to a chatbot. It is not merely that the activity is different; so too is the effect the activities have on our inner life. When he was trying to make sense of the peculiar process involved in reading-with-understanding, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein put it this way: “When I read a poem or narrative with feeling [mit Empfindung], surely something goes on in me which does not go on when I merely skim the lines [die Zeilen … überfliege] for information.” How are we to account for this difference? And how does it relate to the “something” that Wittgenstein refers to? The size of the text has something to do with it. Both Søren Kierkegaard in 1846 and Ray Bradbury in his 1953 novel Fahrenheit 451, warned against the effect of the ever-increasing abbreviation of our modes of writing on our...

Do prediction markets enhance our understanding of the world or corrupt it?

54 min

Even for those who don’t gamble, the exponential growth of online sports betting since 2018 has made it impossible to avoid. Not only have odds and ads been seamlessly integrated into sports broadcasts, but the language of betting has now become pervasive in sports commentary. Thanks to ease of access through mobile technology and their relative value as ready-made “content”, speculation and predictions are the air that sports fans now breathe. It is into this cultural environment that prediction markets have recently exploded. Prediction markets are online platforms that accept wagers on whether relatively specific events will occur by a certain date, whose payout is determined by the likelihood of that event occurring. These zero-sum “event contracts” can cover everything from geopolitics to popular culture. Real examples include: will Justin Bieber perform during the World Cup final half-time show; what will the high temperature be in New York City on a particular day; will Nicolás Maduro still be the president of Venezuela at the end of 2025; will Trump use specific words during the State of the Union; will the second coming of Jesus Christ take place before 2027. Like sports betting, prediction markets have grown rapidly in both value and reach over the last two years. The odds of one platform accompanied the broadcast of the 2026 Golden Globe Awards, and at the end of 2025 media companies like The Wall Street Journal, CNN and CNBC announced partnerships with prediction markets to integrate their data directly into news coverage. Advocates for prediction markets insist they represent a sophisticated form of “crowd sourcing” and that, in a world of unaccountable punditry and rampant misinformation, the financial incentive is a way of getting people to “put their money where their mouth is”. (A similar rationale has been given for the superiority of calculated sports bets over irrational fandom.) We could think of this as a kind of corruption of Karl Marx’s famou...

‘The Devil Wears Prada’ — high fashion or vision of hell?

54 min

It’s no mystery why David Frankel’s 2006 film The Devil Wears Prada was a hit. The movie had all the ingredients of a certain kind of success. Take a bestselling novel (by Lauren Weisberger) about a midwestern girl trying to make it in the big city, place it in the hands of a screenwriter known for broadly appealing rom-coms (Aline Brosh McKenna), cast a much-loved screen legend in an uncharacteristically villainous role (Meryl Streep) and put her alongside a doe-eyed starlet on her way to becoming a superstar (Anne Hathaway) … then set the plot in the rarefied world of haute couture and divide it between New York and Paris — what’s not to love? What is a little surprising is that The Devil Wears Prada should have achieved the quality of a certain timelessness (despite being released a year before the now ubiquitous iPhone). It is a cinema classic whose enduring appeal and pop cultural resonance have been demonstrated by the global success of a sequel, two decades on. But does the film’s success point to narrative and thematic elements that run much deeper than the appeal of the glossy surface? Take, for instance, the obvious Faustian connection, evoked both in the title of the film and the blunt words of Emily (played by Emily Blunt) to Andrea Sachs (Hathaway): “You sold your soul the day you put on your first pair of Jimmy Choos.” The narrative arc of the film is, broadly, the naïve Andy’s “descent” into the world of high fashion, cultural influence and sterile, superficial beauty, only to step back from the hellmouth of corruptibility at the end, lest she too share Miranda Priestly’s (Streep) unhappy fate. Does this mean that Andy also shares in Faust’s culpability, less a victim than a participant in his own damnation? Who, then, plays the role of the seducer? Who is the film’s Mephistopheles, also trapped in a hell of diabolical design? Is it Emily — starved, harried, contemptuous, miserable? Is it Christian Thompson (Simon Baker) — urbane, erudite, well-connec...

Copyright theft is AI’s original sin — are we doomed to repeat it?

54 min

Essential to the profitability and widespread adoption of modern technologies is the need to conceal their costs — the human labour, the unjust or exploitative working conditions, the environmental degradation and drain on natural resources, the reduction of precious goods to mere ‘raw material’. By means of such concealment, those who enjoy the conveniences these technologies afford are lulled into a state of (what Hannah Arendt called) “unthinkingness”. The benefits simply appear, and consumers are left incurious about how it could have happened so quickly, so cheaply, with so little friction. The other thing that is crucial for the success of such technologies is the way that their speed, financial backing and sheer scale project a sense of irresistibility — what Shoshana Zuboff has termed “the cult of inevitabilism”. Put otherwise, the belief that resistance, however principled and noble, is ultimately futile. So get on board or get out of the way. Artificial intelligence represents, in many ways, the apogee of both aspects. The assumption that AI development hovers somewhere between an “arms race” with existential stakes and the key to unlocking untold productivity and economic growth has had the effect of reducing calls for prudential care and democratic consultation to little more than inconveniences to be gotten around rather than objections to be engaged with meaningfully. At the same time, the twin mantras of “more compute” (more chips, more data centres, more electricity) and “more data sets” have been used to legitimate both the expenditure of unimaginable sums of money and the indiscriminate (and ultimately illegal) use of intellectual property for the training of AI models. You could call this theft generative AI’s original sin. In both cases, the guiding philosophy seems to be that the purportedly beneficial ends will have justified the unprincipled means. Which is to say, the emergence of artificial general intelligence will cicatrise the moral wound...

Last Words: ‘I’ve Been to the Mountaintop’ — Martin Luther King, Jr in Memphis

54 min

In 1967, after reaching the heights of social and political influence in 1963, after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, and having been instrumental in the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr watched his popular support fall precipitously away. He had reached the lowest point of his life on the public stage, with fully two-thirds of Americans disapproving of him.  King’s rousing vision of nonviolence — of racial coexistence within a community defined by mutuality, interdependence and love — seemed to be growing ever more remote following the landmark civil rights legislation. The Black Power movement was gaining influence, and in 1967 alone there had been 76 violent riots across major American cities. Then, in April 1967, King denounced the US military involvement in Vietnam — a war that was wildly popular with the vast majority of Americans. For his supporters, it was strategically counterproductive to so connect the cause of civil rights with the goals of peace activists; while Barry Goldwater, the standard bearer of a kind of atavistic conservatism, characterised King’s words as treasonous. King had also grown concerned that the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts represented, for many Americans, the end of their concern. This legislation had ushered in a kind of complacency that absolved them from any further inconvenience or moral concern. Now that Black people had been granted equality de jure, what was needed was for them to be accorded equality de facto — especially in education, employment and housing, and not only in the South. Therefore, in the autumn of 1967 King launched what would be known as the Poor People’s Campaign, which was meant to culminate in a new march on Washington DC in the spring of 1968. But disagreement with the ambitions and unruliness of the campaign from within, coupled with outright antipathy from the Johnson administration due to his opposition to the war in Vi...

Why the anxieties over multiculturalism? What’s the appeal of a monocultural society?

54 min

If One Nation leader Pauline Hanson managed to reignite a public debate with her assertion that Australia is “a multiracial society, but we must be monocultural” during her address last week to the National Press Club, it is only because certain anxieties over multiculturalism have long been smouldering in the social undergrowth, just waiting to be fanned into flame. The question of immigration, handwringing over the racial constitution of the nation and the desire to maintain Australia’s essential “Britishness” go back at least as far as the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act. And these concerns continued to resurface throughout the twentieth century. As the then Minister for Immigration and future leader of the Liberal Party, Billy Snedden, said in 1969 (the year after Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech): “I am quite determined we should have a monoculture, with everyone living in the same way, understanding each other, and sharing the same aspirations. We don’t want pluralism.” It wasn’t long afterward, the White Australia Policy was dismantled and multiculturalism became official national policy, culminating in the 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia. Just seven years later, the rise of John Howard and the election of Pauline Hanson placed both multiculturalism and immigration back on the table. Debates over the proper levels of immigration are, of course, entirely appropriate in a healthy democracy. Immigration policy is something about which citizens should be able to deliberate and disagree without fear being called xenophobic. But something potentially dangerous happens when the debate turns to multiculturalism, as longstanding government policy, itself. For then we are not discussing prudential concerns about the proper allocation of limited social and economic resources; instead, we are discussing the desirability, or not, of our fellow citizens, our neighbours, those with whom we find ourselves pursuing a common life. We are discussing w...

One Nation is on the rise — but do we know what it means?

54 min

Over the last twelve months, there have been two conspicuous trends in federal politics. One is the precipitous decline in electoral support for the Liberal Party, which began before last year’s federal election and has continued apace ever since. The other is the rise in One Nation’s electoral fortunes, which began to tick upwards in September but then took a leap in December and January. Both trends converged, rather spectacularly, in the latest Resolve Political Monitor, conducted for the Nine newspapers. Not only had the Coalition’s primary vote drop to 20 per cent (an all-time low), but One Nation’s primary vote shot up to 29 per cent (passing Labor on 28 per cent). Moreover, Pauline Hanson emerged as preferred prime minister with a third of respondents, while Anthony Albanese was selected by 29 per cent — opposition leader Angus Taylor took only 16 per cent of nominations. This poll comes little more than a month after One Nation won the Farrer by-election in rural New South Wales, with a commanding 40 per cent of the primary vote, thereby gaining its first lower house seat in federal parliament. And it came days before Pauline Hanson’s first address to the National Press Club in Canberra, three decades after she entered parliament. Almost exactly forty years ago, then opposition leader John Howard famously said “the times will suit me”. The same could now be said for Pauline Hanson. For three decades she has been a fixture of federal politics. The major parties have variously denounced and attempted to accommodate her views on immigration, multiculturalism and Indigenous policy, among other things. But while the political landscape around her has changed, she has not. If anything, due to the excesses of political rhetoric and perverse incentives of a social-media saturated informational ecosystem, the electorate has grown inured to what once would have been scandalous, perhaps even disqualifying. In an age of Trump, Hanson comes across to many voters as simpl...

The ethics of ‘longtermism’ — what are our obligations to the future?

54 min

One of the criticisms often directed at democratic politics is that it is irresponsibly, even dangerously, short-term in its orientation. The wellbeing of future generations, to say nothing of the sustainability of the planet, rarely matter more to lawmakers than the cost-of-living pressures experienced by their constituents or the outcome of the next election cycle. Short-termism, therefore, would seem to be baked into democracy; hence, for some, the only way to act seriously with the future in mind would be for those with power and resources to do so unilaterally. There is no denying that democratic politics is constrained by short-term thinking. It is likewise true that our moral imaginations suffer from the incapacity to recognise the claim that future generations may properly make on our current actions — or even to recognise that such moral obligations exist in the first place. But there is no reason to deny such obligations. As Annette Baier argues, the “only special feature in the moral tie between us and future generations lies in the inferiority of our knowledge about them, not in the inferiority of their ontological status … Neither their non-presence, nor our ignorance of who exactly they are, nor our uncertainty concerning how many of them there are, rules out the appropriateness of recognizing rights on their part.” In line with this sentiment — though shorn of the concept of obligation that the language of “rights” assumes — a number of influential philosophers have made a case for what they’ve called “longtermism”. Its central tenets are relatively straightforward. William MacAskill lays them out in his best-selling book What We Owe the Future: “that, impartially considered, future people should count for no less, morally, than the present generation”;“that there may be a huge number of future people”;“that life, for them, could be extraordinarily good or inordinately bad”;“that we really can make a difference to the world they inhabit”.Because this...

Last Words: The ‘Farewell Sermon’ of the Prophet Muhammad

54 min

It could be said that human beings reveal who they most truly are as they approach the end. For the end of one’s life is not simply its terminus ad quem; it is also its telos, its goal or meaning. A life that has been lived in the thrall of egotism, whose fundamental pursuit has been the safeguarding and satisfaction of the self, will almost certainly, at the end, turn inward upon itself and find itself grasping, desperately, at something like immortality — as the indefinite prolonging of the self. It would not be surprising for such a life to be shrunken, fearful, petty, suspicious, diminished at the end, rather than open-handed, open-hearted, at peace. Consider the example of Shakespeare’s King Lear, who craves flattery and reassuring falsehoods, who obsesses over small offenses and slights to his ego, who remains unconcerned with truthfulness and unnourished by the love of his youngest daughter. On the other hand, a life that is lived meaningfully — which is to say, a life that serves a purpose beyond itself — is able to approach the end without fear, not only because a certain humility has become a habit of life, but because the prospect of the end brings what is most important into sharper focus. This is perhaps what Socrates had in mind when he said that “the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” (Phaedo, 64a). Here we could think of Martin Luther King, Jr’s final sermon at Mason Temple in Memphis, Tennessee, on 3 April 1968, during which he reflects on threats made to his life. “Like anybody, I would like to live a long life”, he admits. “Longevity has its place.” Then he immediately says, “But I’m not concerned about that now. I just want to do God’ will … And I’m happy, tonight. I’m not worried about anything. I’m not fearing any man.” Or consider the philosopher Stanley Cavell, writing tenderly in his memoir that, “anticipating the ending of my life, I am becoming freer than ever of the desire to...

The Problem of Nationalism, with David Moscrop — Live at the Sydney Writers’ Festival

54 min

It’s common these days to refer to “the return of nationalism”. But that assumes that nationalism receded for a time, like the tide, and here the world is, now, getting its pants legs wet. Such an assumption misunderstands the peculiar character of nationalism. It would be better to think of it as a swell, as a political phenomenon that periodically gathers power and force, that crests and crashes, but that never entirely goes away. It’s always there, beneath us. Nationalism belongs to the emotional valence of the collective life of a nation state. Using the analogy of Aristotle’s taxonomy of the moral emotions — with, say, cowardice on one end of a continuum, foolhardiness on the other, and courage sitting in between — we could even think of nationalism as an extreme expression of the bundle of political emotions that ordinarily manifest as civic pride or patriotism, among them: love and fear, loyalty and hatred, attachment and jealousy. But with nationalism, it is as though the emotional balance is out of whack.  Ever since the origin of the term at the end of the eighteenth century and its subsequent emergence in the nineteenth, nationalism has typically been associated with three components: Membership — the recognition of an “imagined community” constituted through shared language, ethnicity, religion, geography and so on;Self-determination — the demand for sovereignty over a defined territory;“Civil religion” — the existence of self-reinforcing symbols, practices, rituals, stories which serve to reify “the nation”, turning the abstract idea of national membership into a lived experience.While there is undeniable overlap with patriotism, nationalism adds the additional element of bellicosity. Not just national pride but superiority. Not just love of one’s own place and people (patria), but a corresponding antipathy toward other nations — including “others” within one’s own borders. Nationalism thus tends to be a Janus-faced phenomenon, with its heedless pursuit...

What is the moral of Marlowe’s ‘Doctor Faustus’?

54 min

There are four stories that could justifiably be described as foundational to Western culture: the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden; Prometheus’s gift of fire to humanity; Doctor Faustus’s pact with the devil; and Victor Frankenstein’s act of monstrous creation. Not only are the principal names immediately evocative to anyone who hears them, but that recognisability allows for nearly endless variations on their original themes. This is, in part, what gives these stories their staying power. But these stories could themselves be said to represent four variations on a still older theme: the longing for some forbidden knowledge, to transgress a proscribed limit — or as WH Auden would put it, the desire to “know too much”. In each instance, rightly or wrongly, the pursuit itself brings a severe punishment, even catastrophe. This is what gives each of these foundational stories an element of tragedy, of pathos. About whom could it not be said that, even though we know the danger of going too far, we want to do it anyway? And yet it is at this point that an important difference emerges between Faustus and the other three stories. Eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, granting fire to humankind and giving life to a “creature” of one’s own making all point a certain ambition, a restlessness, an unwillingness to remain in a perceived state of underdevelopment or adolescence. The consequences of that restlessness may still be both foreseeable and severe, and so suggest a lack of wisdom or trust or prudence — but that doesn’t mean the acts themselves are either base or self-seeking. The same cannot quite be said of Christopher Marlowe’s depiction of Doctor John Faustus at the end of the sixteenth century. It is true that, at the outset, explicit reference is made to the flight of Icarus from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, who fastened wings to his back with wax, but which melted when he ventured too close to the sun. Speaking of Faustus: “His waxen wings did mo...

Does the budget have a coherent underlying philosophy?

54 min

The federal budget is, in many respects, the high point of Australia's political calendar. This federal budget is no exception. The public had been primed for weeks to expect a series of significant reforms this year. But it is striking how little there is in the budget by way of direct social benefit. The budget is broadly redistributive — it removes certain tax concessions that disproportionately benefit the wealthy — but it does not then distribute that additional tax revenue to those struggling with cost-of-living pressures. Even the $250 permanent annual tax offset for workers is quite modest and deliberately non-inflationary. It would seem that the object of this “rebalancing” through changes to capital gains tax, negative gearing and discretionary trusts is “intergenerational equity” itself: the budget adjusts the tax system so that it benefits property investors less than first home buyers — even if these benefits are dispersed over time and only gradually felt. The question is, does the underlying philosophy of this federal budget provide a template for budgets-to-come? Guest: Luara Ferracioli is Associate Professor in Political Philosophy at the University of Sydney, and Philosopher-in-Residence at the Sydney Policy Lab. — THE MINEFIELD - LIVE AT THE SYDNEY WRITERS’ FESTIVAL 24 May 2026 “The Return of Nationalism and the Crisis of Democracy” With each new election, geopolitical deal and technological advancement, it seems like the ideals of democracy are slipping away. In this special live recording of ABC Radio National’s The Minefield, hosts Waleed Aly and Scott Stephens discuss the state of democracy today with Canadian podcaster and political scientist David Moscrop. When: Sunday, 24 May 2026, 4-5pm Where: Carriageworks, 245 Wilson Street, Eveleigh, NSW, 2015 To purchase your tickets: https://www.swf.org.au/program/festival-2026/abc-the-minefield-live — NEXT WEEK: Christopher Marlowe’s “Doctor Faustus” Expressions like “deal with the devil”, “selling o...

Are ‘reaction videos’ dulling our ability to be genuinely responsive?

54 min

One of the by-products of digital technology’s pervasiveness in our lives is its seeming irresistibility. However much we try to remain conscientious objectors, to resist its allure, its promises of convenience and casual pleasures, to keep some part of our inner lives free of its influence, we soon discover that it is of the essence of new technological forms to exceed their boundaries, to seep out into the wider culture — into our language, our rhythms and habits, our expectations, our ways of seeing and interacting with the world. Such that, before long, we find we’ve become like the technologies we created. It’s like the Turing Test, but in reverse. And once that happens, precisely because there’s no longer any “outside”, it can become very difficult to think clearly about what is, in effect, our habitus. This is how technology ushers us into a condition of unthinkingness. Perhaps we could call it habituation. Digital technology’s irresistibility and sheer scale can make our efforts at thinking seem tiny, irrelevant, insignificant. Perhaps the best we can do is occasionally pause, and try to make sense of underlying rules that govern online experience — perhaps we could call it “the grammar of online life”: the rules of the game, as it were, that you must obey if you want to go viral. Over the last ten years, one of the most popular forms of online content is the reaction video — a kind of split-screen experience in which viewers watch both a piece of content (the livestream of a game, a movie trailer, a music video, another YouTube clip and so on) and another person’s reaction to that content. There is something about the desire to see the facial responses of other people, their seemingly spontaneous responses to what they see and hear, that is inseparable from the viewers’ enjoyment of the content itself. It is similar to the experience of hearing audience laughter during a sitcom, and before that “canned laughter”. Emotion here is the currency. But the point...

NDIS reforms may be necessary, but they’re also morally fraught

54 min

In a speech to the National Press Club, Health Minister Mark Butler announced a series of sweeping changes that the federal government will make to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). In the thirteen years since it was legislated, the growth of the NDIS has surpassed all expectations. By 2030, the Productivity Commission projected that the scheme would cover around 550,000 people and cost about $40 billion. This year there are already 760,000 people on the scheme at a cost of $50 billion. On the current trajectory, by the end of the decade there will be 900,00 people on the NDIS and it will cost $70 billion per year — this would represent a greater expenditure than Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme put together. Concerns over the affordability of the NDIS are nothing new, and since returning to government Labor has repeatedly indicated their intention to curb its growth (even if, while in opposition, they resisted the Coalition’s efforts to do the same). But in an economy threatened by high inflation and at a time of increasing cost-of-living pressures — from fuel and food to housing — it is understandable that the federal government would feel a certain urgency to bring the NDIS under control, not least for the sake of the long-term viability of the scheme. And yet, what was telling about Butler’s speech was the way he proceeded to justify the radical changes the government has in store for the NDIS — which include removing around 160,000 people from the scheme by 2030 and reducing the projected annual cost by $15 billion. He swiftly pivoted from its long-term viability to its declining “community support, or social licence”. Citing research conducted by Talbot Mills, Butler claimed that 70 per cent of Australians think the NDIS has “gotten too large and struggles with dodgy providers” and that 60 per cent think the scheme is “broken”. He went on to detail mistakes in design and “structural flaws” that make the NDIS susceptible to fraud....

Smart glasses — a new frontier of foreseeable digital harm?

54 min

There has long been a gap between the emergence of new forms of technology and the development of laws designed to mitigate their dangers. But with the rapid advances in artificial intelligence and immersive technologies, that gap is becoming increasingly problematic. Take the example of wearable technology, such as smart glasses. Companies like Meta, in particular, have poured vast amounts of money into the development and commercialisation of augmented reality (XR) headsets. This would seem to represent the natural extension of the decades-long ambition to commodify and capture the attention of users — combined now with seamless search, audio, call, image/video and geolocation functions. But quite apart from their troubling military and law enforcement applications, there are a range of ethical problems presented by the widespread adoption of smart glasses. For example, on the side of the wearer/user, the interposition of technology directly into one’s field of vision — thereby making the technology the immediate object of one’s gaze — corrupts the ethical concept of attentiveness and further erodes our capacity to be morally present to others in a technologically unmediated way. Smart glasses also erode the concept of a shared reality by imposing prompts from interested parties and advertisers directly into users’ field of vision. And speaking of interested parties, don’t these forms of wearable technology represent new means of acquiring vast amounts of data for advertisers and the training of large language models? What about those who are being observed by wearers of smart glasses? We are assured that safety measures are in place to indicate to non-consenting parties that they are being recorded. But even if those safeguards are trustworthy, the mere possibility of misuse imposes a degree of suspicion between persons that cannot help but be corrosive. And this doesn’t approach the opportunities for abuse that are presented by the technology itself — not least...

The price of sovereignty: Are we prepared to pay more for less vulnerability?

54 min

Ever since the eighteenth century, there has been a prevailing belief that mutually beneficial commercial relationships between nations provide a powerful disincentive to international conflict. Montesquieu perhaps put it best in his Spirit of the Laws (XX.1-2): “Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce there are gentle mores … The natural effect of commerce leads to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs.” After the devastation of the First and Second World Wars, the principle that commerce is conducive to peace was the guiding philosophy behind the establishment of some of our vital international institutions. And even if its implementation has been inconsistent and most of the economic benefits have tended to flow upward toward wealthier nations, the belief was that such disparities represent a fault in design not in the animating principle itself. We should remember, for instance, the role interdependence played in thawing Cold War antipathies. As West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt told US President Jimmy Carter in 1980 regarding Germany’s decision to develop a joint energy policy with the Soviet Union, “those engaged in trade with each other do not shoot at one another”. But the practices of interdependence and “oil diplomacy” that emerged from energy crises of 1973 and 1979 paradoxically reinforced the reality of a further source of instability — one that has become especially pronounced in 2022 and again in 2026, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the current conflict in the Middle East. And that is what Michael LaBelle calls the use of energy as a “weapon of war”, in which assertions of state sovereignty intentionally disrupt relationships of energy interdependence in order to...

Social cohesion is straining — can citizens’ assemblies help?

54 min

There is a thread that’s been left dangling from our show at the end of last year on Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s fourteenth century “Allegory of Good and Bad Government”, painted on the walls of the Sala dei Nova in Siena’s Palazzo Pubblico. The dominant figure of Justice sits on the left side of the central mural. She has her thumbs on two scales to hold them in balance, with angels on either side meeting out punishment and just recompense. Directly below her sits the figure of Concord (Concordia), a carpenter’s plane across her lap, as she weaves together the judgements into a red-and-white braided rope. This rope then passes from her hand to the hand of the first of 24 citizens who stand along the base of the mural. The rope finally becomes the staff held by the figure of “the Good Commune” — or, perhaps, “the Common Good”. It is as though the Common Good is constituted by concord among citizens, from which citizens in turn hope to receive what is necessary for their shared life. From Roman philosophers like Cicero down to the artists of the Italian Renaissance, there has been an understanding that concord — or what we now might call “social cohesion” — proceeds from the fair distribution of justice, and is grounded in the confidence of citizens that it is being distributed fairly. But what happens when concord begins to fray? This month, the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion will be handing down its interim report. It is fair to say that, since the horrific attack at Bondi Beach that precipitated the establishment of the commission, social cohesion is under severe strain, perhaps to breaking point for some communities. The question for us now is: When the conditions of public trust in a society have weakened, could the deliberative capacity of a mini-public — such as a citizens’ assembly — help restore it? Guest: Ron Levy is a Professor in the College of Law, Governance and Policy at the Australian National University.

Why do democracies seem so fragile in the face of shortages?

54 min

Within days of the commencement of the war that has enveloped the Middle East — and that continues to severely disrupt global energy supplies — a familiar pattern began to emerge in some of the world’s most prosperous democracies. Much as they did at the outset of the pandemic, people began stockpiling. Then, it was toilet paper and food; this time, it’s fuel. In cities across Australia, long lines formed outside petrol stations and tensions flared as motorists seized their opportunity to fill not just their cars, but jerry cans as well. Since then, the fears that motivated this behaviour have only heightened as the war goes on, petrol prices sharply rise and “not in use” signs appear on petrol pumps. The federal and state governments have already introduced measures designed soften the economic blow of significantly more expensive fuel. And while the prospect of rationing fuel reserves remains some distance away — at this stage, at least — the Prime Minister is nonetheless urging Australians not to use “more fuel than you need”. It is nonetheless telling that the mere possibility of fuel rationing has seemingly sent a chill down the nation’s collective spine. The prospect of government restrictions on petrol is tailormade to the exacerbate the underlying conditions of distrust, division and resentment, and to make the parties who are most adept at harnessing that resentment, that distrust, more attractive still. There is something here that is eerily reminiscent to the popular backlash to US President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 “Crisis of Confidence” speech to the nation, with its modest request for voluntary sacrifices in the face of a similar energy crisis: “And I’m asking you for your good and for your nation’s security to take no unnecessary trips, to use carpools or public transportation whenever you can, to park your car one extra day per week, to obey the speed limit, and to set your thermostats to save fuel. Every act of energy conservation like this is more than...

Why Autocracy Needs Spectacle — with M Gessen

53 min

One of the words we use to describe political authority gone wrong is "autocracy": which is to say, the concentration of power in a unitary figure who then exercises that power without countervailing constraints and for its own sake. To borrow an expression of St Augustine, autocracy is a form of political authority that curves in on itself. Because most citizens have a clear sense that governance ought to be for something beyond political self-interest or naked self-enrichment, we rightly take a dim view of politicians who are unmoved by the interests and opinions of their constituents. But, of course, only tyrants are prepared to present themselves as wholly disinterested in the lives of those over whom they rule. Autocrats don't claim to be in it for themselves; they typically insist that they represent, serve and fight for "the people" — but "the people" politically defined as those who truly belong to the nation, those who build and contribute, those who are loyal and patriotic. In short, those who can be encompassed by the political pronouns "us"/"we". Accordingly, autocrats also claim to be defending the nation and its interests against "they"/"them", who have no part or place in the nation's life and are therefore no voice in the conversation of politics. What is corrupting about autocratic rule, then, is not simply that it is "corrupt" in the conventional sense of using the affordances of political office for private gain. Rather, it is the way autocracy throws off the basic constraints that define political authority in a representative democracy, and thereby betrays its character. In democratic life, we are constantly being reminded of the contingency of political authority and its fundamental accountability. When autocratic power lays claim to the necessity of an unconstrainted mode of executive decision-making — most often in the face of some "emergency" which suspends the normal functioning of democratic scrutiny — it corrodes the conditions of democra...

Can illegal wars still be legitimate wars?

54 min

It’s like déjà vu all over again. After launching a devastating but limited series of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and against the nation’s top military leaders and nuclear scientists in June last year, the United States and Israel recommenced hostilities against Iran at the end of February. The objectives of this ‘war’ are similar — to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities and remove the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic regime — but its implementation is more thoroughgoing, more open-ended, more uncontainable, and more problematic in terms of its basis in international law. There is near consensus among international law experts that the US-Israeli attacks on Iran come in violation Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. And yet neither the United States nor Israel seem interested in justifying their actions in terms of their legality (unlike their “middle power” allies, who are intent on using the language of “collective self-defence”). In its place are assertions of power, of unassailable might, of moral legitimacy, of “good and evil”, of an “intolerable threat” posed by Iran. The casual way that international law has been cast off in the conflict that is spreading across the Middle East raises pressing and pertinent questions about the moral considerations that undergird international law itself. Guest: Tamer Morris is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Sydney, where he focusses on international law, United Nations peacekeeping and international humanitarian law. You can read his penetrating article on the illegality and (il)legitimacy of the Iran war on ABC Religion and Ethics.

Ramadan: Politics Straight from the Heart — with Christos Tsiolkas

54 min

If there is something inherently suspicious about political appeals to “the heart” — which is to say, attempts to exploit unreflective prejudices and reactive emotions — then it is also true that a form of politics that is unresponsive to heart-felt appeals to a common humanity, to compassion, to decency, is dangerous. How can we maintain the precarious balance between a politics that trades cheaply on emotion, and one that both comes from and appeals to the heart? Guest: Christos Tsiolkas is the author of eight novels — Loaded, The Jesus Man, Dead Europe, The Slap, Barracuda, Damascus, 7 ½, The In-Between — and the short story collection, Merciless Gods. He is a playwright, screen writer, essayist, radio host and currently a film critic for The Saturday Paper. In September last year, he delivered the 2025 Ray Mathew Lecture at the National Library of Australia, on the topic “Fence-Sitting”.

Ramadan: ‘Do Not Harden Your Heart’ — with Avril Alba

54 min

Over the course of this Ramadan series, we are exploring the contours of a cardiocentric conception of the moral life. The notion of the primacy of the heart goes back three millennia: it finds expression in the ancient cultures of Mesopotamia, Egypt and China, and in the philosophy of Aristotle; it pervades the pages of the sacred texts and subsequent traditions of Judaism and Islam — and even now, its remnants persist in our everyday speech, as if to remind us of an older wisdom. In this broader conception, the heart is a kind of physio-spiritual organ which, at once, coordinates the body’s movements by providing its orientation within and opens the person to moral realities without. A central feature of “the heart”, then, is its capacity for moral responsiveness. The heart is not all there is to the moral life — there is moral reasoning, and there are moral obligations — but it may not be a stretch to say that “the heart” is the moral life’s indispensable element. In a hadith, Muhammad is reported to have said: “There is a piece of flesh in the body if it becomes good the whole body becomes good but if it gets spoilt the whole body gets spoilt and that is the heart.” Last week, we touched briefly on the fear that is often expressed in Islam of the heart being “sealed off”, rendered impervious to divine wisdom or moral appeal. Within the Jewish tradition, this fear is expressed in terms of the heart being “hardened” (literally “toughened” or “strengthened”). In both traditions, this condition is most particularly associated with the figure of the Pharaoh of Egypt (see, for instance, Exodus 7:13, 22; 8:16; 9:24; Qurʾān 10:88). He is not, and cannot be, responsive to the divine appeal — and for that reason, he is damned. Because the worst thing that can happen to a heart is for it become hardened, Pharaoh acts as a cautionary figure (see Deuteronomy 15:7). Through his repeated refusals, his heart toughens to the point that it grows impervious — at which point, his h...

Ramadan: Having a ‘Change of Heart’ — with Claire Zorn

54 min

Sometimes the language we use every day, often unthinkingly, contains within it traces of a much older wisdom. Consider the phrases “I’ve changed my mind” and “I’ve had a change of heart”. The first thing to notice is activity described by the verbs: one is something that we do — as the result of learning new information, or having experiences that alter our values or view of the world; the other is something we undergo, something that happens to us — we see something we couldn’t see before (as though the light shines differently upon it, as Wittgenstein would say), or the same person or phenomenon evokes a different feeling from us. Perhaps it’s accurate to say that changing one’s mind is like taking a different path or going in a different direction, whereas having a change of heart is more like changing one’s compass bearings. But does that mean we are simply passive when it comes to such a reorientation of heart? In this Ramadan series, we are examining what we’re calling the cardiocentrism of the moral life — which is to say, the vital importance of cultivating the inner disposition of what we most often call “the heart”: the faculty which stands for both our inner-most selves, and that which makes us receptive to moral realities or truths outside of ourselves. The heart can act as a kind of moral compass which responds to moral realities we’d prefer to evade or avoid. Consider the pivotal moment in J M Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello, when the eponymous character responds to demands for reasons or “principles” that would ground her horror in response to the mass killing of animals for food: “I was hoping not to have to enunciate principles”, she says. “If principles are what you want … I would have to respond, open your heart and listen to what your heart says.” So perhaps we can’t change our hearts, but does this suggest it is incumbent on us to maintain a certain “openness” or sustained “exposure” to moral realities we’d rather ignore — and that such open...

Ramadan: The Heart and the Moral Life — with Stephen Darwall

54 min

Judging by the way we use the word in everyday speech, we intuitively know what we mean when we refer to “the heart”. We are most often gesturing toward the essence of a thing, its core, what you reach once you strip everything non-essential away. That idea is very much in keeping with what we do each year during the month of Ramadan: we try to put wider concerns and contentious debates in politics, society and culture to the side in order to focus on some of the more fundamental dispositions and practices that sustain and deepen the moral life — essential things that we frequently neglect in our haste and agitation. But, of course, that’s not the only way we use the word “heart”. It’s also a reference to what is truest about us, our interior orientation, what we want and value, sometimes despite our attempts to present ourselves otherwise or dissemble what secretly resides within. When we use terms like “heartfelt” or “heart-to-heart”, aren’t we talking about a deeper kind of emotion or a more sincere or authentic kind of conversation, one in which certain conventions or forms of conventionalised self-presentation have been set aside? The idea of the centrality of the heart is a very old one, stretching back to the ancient cultures of Egypt, Mesopotamia and China. But it was Aristotle in the fourth century BCE who gave the concept of ‘cardiocentrism’ its most thoroughgoing articulation. He considered the heart to be the organising principle of the body — its primary organ, its ‘archē’. The heart is the location of the soul and the source of the body’s heat; it is the organ that receives sensory stimuli from without and directs the body’s movements from within. He thus conceived of the heart as constituting, at once, the seat of intelligence, emotion, will, desire and sensation, and the inherent (or efficient) cause of the body’s unity, integrity and coordination. This cardiocentric conception would eventually be taken up in the High Middle Ages by theologians and p...

What can headcoverings teach us about individuality, dignity and modesty?

54 min

One of the most unyielding aspects of life in the modern West is, perhaps, the ultimate value that we’ve come to accord to appearance. It is as though our essence, all that matters most about us as human beings, lies on the surface: our soul resides in our skin; how we look reveals who we truly are. Over the last three decades, this has become especially pronounced through our various forms, not so much of self-expression as self-creation — from hair removal (or recovery) to body art, from strict fitness regimens and body sculpting through to the widespread uptake of GLP-1 weight-loss drugs. None of these activities are wrong or detrimental in and of themselves. But when the gap between people is an ontological one — those who are self-creations are of a higher order than those who are still subject to the natural order — the result can be a hierarchy of beings whereby one is viewed with envy and the other with contempt. This can, of course, create its own drive toward conformity and belonging (experienced as an elevation in status) and the desire to escape social punishment, from shame. Fashion can work similarly. As W. David Marx puts it: “Fashion is a never-ending process of ‘chase and flight’. Low-status individuals chase high-status individuals by imitating their conventions, which forces elites to flee to new ones. Since this fleeing will lead to another round of chasing and then fleeing, fashion creates perpetual cultural change, with status serving as the motor.” Again, there is nothing inherently problematic about the desire to conform — which is to say, belong — or the complex cultural demands asserted by fashion. But when it becomes a form of tyranny, the criterion by which our social status is judged, and either fashion or its fashionable refusal becomes the primary means by which we express our sense of ‘self’, the effect can have a suffocating, rather than freeing, effect on our inner life. We partly acknowledge as much already in places like Australia...

Can political moderation survive in an age of grievance?

54 min

One of the common laments we heard last November, as Australia marked the fiftieth anniversary of the dismissal of the Whitlam government, was that Australian politics has lost its ambition — that the Labor Party, in particular, no longer had the stomach to take big risks and pursue sweeping reforms. The very act of celebrating the audacity of Gough Whitlam, it seemed, was designed to deliver a stinging rebuke to the moderation of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. There is, of course, a compelling counterargument that can be made. Voters tend not to reward ambitious proposals for reform — especially not from opposition, as both John Hewson and Bill Shorten learned — and they will sooner withdraw support from an incumbent government than vest it with confidence and a broad mandate. Voters’ fear of finding themselves on the wrong side of the “winners/losers” ledger is just too great. The decline of centrist political parties, the fragmentation of the electorate and the rise of opportunistic electoral coalitions around sometimes incommensurable, often inchoate grievances, moreover, has made it easier for political entrepreneurs and the parties of grievance amass influence. The French political philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon characterised this as the politics of rejection, as the exercise of “negative sovereignty”, as the aggregation of discontent — and, as he puts it: “Rejection is the simplest thing to aggregate. Indeed, all rejections are identical, regardless of what may have motivated them.” Put otherwise, it’s easier to get to “No” than it is to “Yes”. Albanese is clearly attuned to these political realities. At the 2022 election, he was the beneficiary of widespread disaffection with Scott Morrison and of his own self-presentation as an inoffensive, steady, safe pair of hands. He watched the Voice referendum come undone through the aggregation of rejection. In 2025, Labor’s large parliamentary majority owed plenty to Australian voters’ disdain for Donald Trump, an...

From Venezuela to Greenland — how to respond to Trump’s territorial ambitions?

1 hr 2 min

If there is a single adjective that captures the difference, both in tone and in action, between Donald Trump’s first presidential term and his second, it’s “unconstrained”. Whatever limits might have been placed on his conduct, his designs, his instincts during his first administration — legal, congressional, electoral, conventional — now seem to have fallen away, leaving Trump emboldened to pursue a series of ambitions that he’s long harboured. Mass deportations by militarised agents, revenge against his political opponents, the extortion of purportedly unsympathetic institutions (most notably law firms and universities) and his own personal enrichment have, perhaps, been the most brazen of these pursuits. But over the last two months, a different kind of ambition has come into view: the desire for territorial expansion and absolute sway over the countries and territories of the western hemisphere. This first manifested itself in the Trump administration’s increasing fixation on Venezuela. It began as a series of nearly two dozen missile strikes on boats in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean that were purportedly carrying narcotics on behalf of drug cartels, then proceeded to the seizure of oil tankers departing Venezuela, and finally culminating in the brazen capture and arraignment of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro on drug trafficking charges. While Maduro’s corruption and brutality are notorious, and there is some precedent for the kind of case that is being brought against him, what was alarming was Trump’s clear interest in Venezuela’s oil reserves and his insistence on keeping Maduro’s unelected government in place under a care-taker leader, Delcy Rodríguez. His rationale was as brutal as it was clear: “if [Rodríguez] doesn’t do what’s right” — which is to say, what the Trump administration dictates — “she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro”. It’s no stretch to suspect that Maduro’s capture and prosecution was meant...

What does hate speech do — and why is it so hard to legislate against?

54 min

The massacre at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025 — during which two gunmen targeted a group of Jewish Australians who had gathered to mark the first day of Hanukkah, killing 15 people — violently punctuated two years of escalating antisemitic incidents. Bondi was an act of terror that realised the worst fears of many Australian Jews, who had seen their synagogues and restaurants torched, their houses, schools and electorate offices vandalised, and members of their community ostracised, harassed and abused on city streets, in cultural institutions, on university campuses. Adding insult to grievous injury was the fact that so many Australian Jews had expressed their feeling of being estranged and afraid within their own country, only to have their fears routinely minimised or dismissed. Horrific events of this kind invariably elicit a collective reckoning. What are the contributing factors that created the conditions in which something like this could occur, and what can be done to ensure nothing like it happens again? For many Australians, the act of discriminatory violence at Bondi represented a four-fold failure: the inability of police and intelligence services to prevent the attack;the laxness of existing gun control laws;the inadequacy of laws involving hate speech, hate crimes and hate groups;the unwillingness to take the fears and experiences of members of the Jewish community seriously in the face of rising antisemitism.The first and last of these failures will be the particular focus of the recently announced royal commission. But the Albanese government was intent on moving quickly to address the second and third by recalling parliament to pass new legislation. In so doing, the federal government confronted some of the dangers involved in legislating in the aftermath of a national tragedy. Not only are there the general risks of overreach, of scapegoating, or of unintended consequences due to laws that are written either too specifically or too vaguely. Ther...

Anna Funder on the ethical and aesthetic problem of monstrous artists

54 min

How should we wrestle with the problem of loving the art, but being unsettled by the behaviour or the beliefs of the artist who created it? It would be a mistake to see it as just an ethical problem. It is also an aesthetic problem. Because knowing what we know causes us to see the work differently.

"There's a horse loose in a hospital": Is John Mulaney a comedic genius?

54 min

Could a stand-up routine ever rise to the level of "art" — the kind of performance that rewards multiple viewings, whose humour grows and deepens, which contains subtleties waiting to be discovered? Enter US comedian John Mulaney with a 2017 comedy sketch. There is something undeniably enduring, timeless even about Mulaney's act.

The importance of letting someone 'save face'

54 min

When saving face is paramount to all other considerations, others invariably pay the price in order for the untrammeled supremacy of the ego to persist. But by permitting someone to "save face", are we not providing a constructive way of keeping them within a moral community?

How do recommendation algorithms affect our sense of taste?

54 min

There are few things more peculiar to a person than their preferences; why they favour one genre of music or one style of writing over another. And in our world of endless digital reproduction, we increasingly rely on recommendation algorithms to curate or triage our encounters with culture. But algorithms tend toward massification; they rule out the possibilities of both aesthetic achievement and sheer surprise.

AI and the cost to human life — with Karen Hao

54 min

AI is sometimes portrayed in utopian terms as the essential technological innovation. At other times, it's described as representing an existential threat to human life, a technological creation that will inevitably lay waste to its creator. Regardless of how we view it, could the cost of AI extend far beyond economics?

What can we learn about politics from Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s ‘Good and Bad Government’?

54 min

It is one of the casualties of democratic politics that citizens rarely remain indifferent about the governments they elect. By investing politicians with their hopes or fears, their aspirations and anxieties, voters ensure that they will take the performance of a government personally. This is why politics cannot be emptied of emotion: electors and the elected are bound together by filaments of expectation and accountability, and the conditions of their common life depend on the maintenance of those delicate affective bonds. But when contempt, corruption, greed, incompetence, inattentiveness, unresponsiveness, popular suspicion and outright violence are allowed to eat away at these bonds, it is the political and civil life of the nation as a whole that suffers. For in such conditions, good governance becomes impossible — either because politicians habitually treat the electorate with disdain or because voters are so aggrieved that they gravitate towards those who will give voice to their discontent. That’s why it is imperative to do what can be done to strengthen the political, civic and moral bonds that connect citizens with one another and governors with the governed. How might we cultivate the capacity to imagine that politics can, in fact, be a means of pursuing and achieving the good, that there are virtues inherent to the political vocation? It may well begin with the recovery of an almost pastoral vision of politics as what emerges out of a people’s concern to care for their common life. It is just such an imagination that is richly on display in a series of murals painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti on the walls of the Sala dei Nova (the Hall of the Nine, otherwise known as Sala della Pace, the Hall of Peace) in Siena’s Palazzo Pubblico between 1337 and 1340. Lorenzetti’s commission was at once to visualise the philosophical undergirding of the political system of Siena under the stewardship of nine self-selecting governors, and to remind those dispensing justic...

The ethics of life-writing: Memoirs may be popular, but can they be truthful?

54 min

In the world of book sales, what “romantasy” is to fiction, autobiography/memoir is to non-fiction. There is an undeniable appetite for the purportedly true stories of famous or otherwise public figures whose lives are shrouded in PR or private interests. Moreover, autobiographies have a kind of inherent meaning or telos — disparate elements come together to form a narrative which always will have been meaningful. Part of our desire to read such memoirs is certainly prurient, a wish to know more than we are entitled; but part is also inspirational or “admirational”, nourishing the belief or hope that our lives, too, will end up having been meaningful. And yet, there is nothing uncomplicated about the task of telling the story of our lives. There is an ethical flaw at the heart of such a task: given how given we are to self-justification and self-absolution, how ungenerous we can be in response to the actions and intentions of others, how forgiving we can be to our own inconsistencies and hypocrisies, and how blind we often are to the effects our own behaviour to other people’s lives, who’s to say we are adept at narrating our stories truthfully? And yet our story is our own, and there is a certain humiliation, a certain violence, that accompanies an inability to tell it — for our lives to be wholly narrated by someone else, as though we were a footnote to their story. What, then, are some of the ways that we can discover truthfulness “in the innermost parts” (as the Psalms put it)? There are other forms of life-writing that would seem to evade or at least temper the temptation to self-deception. The example of Helen Garner’s decision to publish her diaries — raw, flawed, achingly human — would stand as a morally credible counterpoint to the sheer overwhelming excess of Karl Ove Knausgaard’s My Struggle. Then there’s also the auto-fictional experiment of Rachel’s Cusk’s Outline trilogy, whereby readers come to know the central character only through her attentive con...

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